

APPENDIX
FOR
MEASURING PARTIES' IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS WITH
MANIFESTO DATA: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE
COMPETING METHODS

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LEFT-RIGHT AND VOTERS IN GREECE

In order to investigate whether voters in Greece see the Left-Right (L-R) scale in economic or social terms, we regressed the respondent's L-R self-placement against issues the economic character of the L-R scale as well as non-economic concerns. Taking the 1981 Euro-Barometer data (Euro-Barometer, 1981), we regressed respondents' L-R self placement on four indicators: 1) their score on the materialist-postmaterialist index; and the score of their attitudes towards 2) stronger military defense; 3) public sector expansion; and 4) the role of government in the economy. All four indicators were measured in a 1–4 scale. Whereas all of them easily achieve statistical significance, the sum of the coefficients for each pair of variables (1 and 2 versus 3 and 4) is very similar (1.10 for the non-economic pair and 1.05 for the economic pair). Importantly, they also explain an approximately equal portion of the variance in L-R self placement: $R^2_{non-economic} = .143$ and $R^2_{economic} = .141$. A very similar pattern emerged when we utilised data from the 2003 European Social Survey (European Social Survey, 2003), where attitudes towards homosexuals (non-economic issue) and towards the role of government in reducing income differences (economic issue) appeared to contribute substantially and approximately equally to the amount of variance explained in voters' L-R placement. To be sure, this is not the appropriate occasion to investigate this, undoubtedly interesting, debate in full detail. We only present some sporadic evidence which serves to confirm our intuition about the way the L-R is perceived by the Greek public. Thus, without venturing a claim of equal weights, we argue on the basis of this evidence that L-R is perceived by voters in a more pluralistic way which is not limited to economic issues but also encompasses non-economic ones. This pattern parallels the logic underlying all attempts to construct the L-R dimension with CMP data as we have already argued in the paper. Furthermore, this empirical evidence further justifies the use voters' perceptions as a way to examine the face validity of the proposed L-R measures.

EXAMINING THE DIMENSIONALITY OF ESTIMATES THROUGH FACTOR ANALYSIS

In the paper, we argue that two widely known rules of thumb point to two-factor solutions for each set of items (Left and Right). This has also been pointed out

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TABLE 1. Factor analysis eigenvalues: Right

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.86239	0.31098	1.0000	1.0000
Factor 2	1.55141	0.78116	0.8330	1.8330
Factor 3	0.77025	0.56140	0.4136	2.2466
Factor 4	0.20885	0.05416	0.1121	2.3587
Factor 5	0.15469	0.13205	0.0831	2.4418
Factor 6	0.02264	0.04141	0.0122	2.4540
Factor 7	-0.01877	0.16804	-0.0101	2.4439
Factor 8	-0.18681	0.08047	-0.1003	2.3436
Factor 9	-0.26728	0.19150	-0.1435	2.2001
Factor 10	-0.45878	0.05703	-0.2463	1.9537
Factor 11	-0.51581	0.02398	-0.2770	1.6768
Factor 12	-0.53979	0.18082	-0.2898	1.3869
Factor 13	-0.72061		-0.3869	1.0000

$N = 38$; Method: iterated principal factors, unrotated.

TABLE 2. Factor analysis eigenvalues: Left

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	2.37966	0.97252	1.0000	1.0000
Factor 2	1.40714	0.73308	0.5913	1.5913
Factor 3	0.67406	0.15720	0.2833	1.8746
Factor 4	0.51686	0.33074	0.2172	2.0918
Factor 5	0.18612	0.06531	0.0782	2.1700
Factor 6	0.12081	0.19740	0.0508	2.2208
Factor 7	-0.07660	0.18043	-0.0322	2.1886
Factor 8	-0.25702	0.10031	-0.1080	2.0806
Factor 9	-0.35733	0.06187	-0.1502	1.9304
Factor 10	-0.41920	0.05734	-0.1762	1.7543
Factor 11	-0.47654	0.13068	-0.2003	1.5540
Factor 12	-0.60722	0.10389	-0.2552	1.2988
Factor 13	-0.71111		-0.2988	1.0000

$N = 38$; Method: iterated principal factors, unrotated.

by Warwick (2005: 394) who nevertheless used the resulting two-factor solution to map parties on a two-dimensional space. Our findings in tables 1 and 2 and figure 1, however reveal that the thirteen items for each scale (Left and Right) cannot be encompassed into a single dimension, casting thus doubt on the reliability of the scales used by the ‘standard’ method.

TESTING THE LAGGED EFFECTS OF PARTY MANIFESTOS

In order to test the interesting argument that manifestos are drafted by parties in order to modify voters’ perceptions, we compare the results of the correlations between voters’ positions (from the Mannheim Euro-Barometer Trend File, 2003) and different estimates derived from CMP data, lagged and contemporaneous (table 3). t indicates the contemporaneous assumption and $t - 1$ indicates the lagged




FIGURE 1. Factor analysis screeplots

TABLE 3. Correlations of voters' positions with each method of measuring parties' positions, contemporaneous and lagged

	Standard	Vanilla	2-Stage FA	Domestic	Regression	Inductive
t	.57	.76	.79	.20	.79	.81
$t - 1$.59	.73	.80	.20	.79	.82

assumption. As evident the correlations for the lagged hypothesis are the same for some methods, and only marginally better in others (and in one case worse). The differences are so small that could be also attributed to the fact that the lagged hypothesis was tested with a smaller N (26 instead of 29). As mentioned in the paper, these findings imply that the argument that manifestos might not reflect the position of the party because they indicate party direction (Pelizzo, 2003) cannot explain the lack of face validity, at least for the case of parties in Greece. The results under both scenarios (party position versus party direction) look almost identical.

THE RESIDUALS IN THE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

One of the assumptions upon which the Heise model is based is that once the lagged structure of the key variable is captured (through an AR1 process) changes in time are not due to the same factors across different time points. To check for this possibility, we test the extent to which errors in the prediction of the ideological positions of the parties are correlated between non-adjacent time periods. We predict parties' positions at time t from their positions lagged twice at two different points. We do not choose particular elections in order to maximise the number of cases in the analysis. However, a more concrete example (encompassed in this procedure) would involve the following steps: regressing parties positions in 2000 on their positions in 1993, we take the corresponding residuals and correlate them with the residuals of the predicted values of the 1985 positions, as predicted by the

TABLE 4. Pearson correlations between the residuals of the estimates at $t - 2$ as predicted from $t - 4$ and those of $t - 1$ as predicted from $t - 3$

	Standard	Vanilla	2-Stage FA	Domestic	Regression	Inductive
$Res_{(t-1)(t-3)}$	-.090	.345	-.215	.163	-.144	-.103
$Res_{(t-2)(t-4)}$	(.712)	(.190)	(.424)	(.545)	(.593)	(.703)

$N = 14$; p values in brackets.

1974 positions. The basic precondition for Heise’s model is that those residuals, representing sources of change not captured through the lagged structure of the variable, remain uncorrelated. The results from these correlations are shown in table 4. As shown, no significant pattern is observed across all methods. This indicates that the logic of Heise’s model holds and thus it can be applied for the examination of the reliability of each measure.

To be sure, the small number of cases might cast doubt on the normality assumption imposed by the significance tests employed here. Therefore, to double-check the validity of these findings we follow the same non-parametric procedure as we did with the reliability analysis of the ‘standard’ method. A locally weighted regression is fitted into a scatterplot between the two corresponding residuals. If the findings from table 4 hold, we should observe no linear—or at least monotonic—pattern between the two variables. Figure 2 displays the results and confirms the previous findings. There is no indication, whatsoever, of a significant relationship between the errors. This provides further evidence for the appropriateness of the Heise test, at least in this particular case.

THE LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT OF PASOK AND KKE

One of the most serious problems regarding the face validity of L-R party placement (‘standard’ method) has been the placement of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) to the right of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). As we have explained in our paper and elsewhere (Gemenis and Dinas, forthcoming), PASOK, as a social democratic party much like its west European counterparts, should be placed to the right of the ‘orthodox’ communist KKE. In order to test whether this inconsistency is due to the fact that the ‘standard’ L-R CMP scales contain many non-economic issues, we reanalyze the CMP data by using only economic items to construct the L-R scale. As it is evident from figure 3 below, even when only economic issues are taken into account, KKE still appears to be to the right of PASOK until 1993. Does this mean that PASOK was less ‘capitalist’ than KKE? Anyone who would read these parties’ manifestos would testify that this cannot be true. All the positions advocated by KKE regarding the economy have been clearly more leftist than those advocated by PASOK. Nevertheless, because it is the policy of CMP to measure emphases and not positions (cf. Laver, 2001), KKE and other parties across different countries are erroneously presented as centrist.

Related to this point, we have also tested whether individual items of the ‘standard’ method L-R scale can account for this lack of face validity. We examined the issue of democracy (per202) which is taken to be a left issue in the standard CMP scale. The argument here is that PASOK being more liberal, it would have more frequent references to this item than KKE. This could have resulted in placing




FIGURE 2. A loess curve is fit into a scatterplot between the two different sets of residuals.

PASOK to the left of KKE. Figure 4 shows the trajectory of the two parties only with regard to this item. Importantly, with the only exception of 1977 and 2000, there is no other instance in which PASOK appears to report this item more than KKE. Most of the times, especially in the crucial period from 1974 until 1990, the pattern is rather reversed, implying that, if not anything else per202 cannot explain the observed pattern.

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


FIGURE 3. L-R placement of PASOK and KKE using only the economic CMP categories.




FIGURE 4. Emphasis on democracy (per202), PASOK and KKE.

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